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Abstract
While ￿nancial incentives usually have a signi￿cant e⁄ect on the labor supply of married women
and single mothers, the evidence about the participation elasticity of childless singles, and single males
especially, is more scant. This is, however, important in countries like France and Germany, where
single individuals constitute the core of social assistance recipients. As yet, there is no conclusive
evidence about whether, and to what extent, this group is a⁄ected by the ￿nancial disincentives em-
bedded in the generous redistributive programs in place in these countries. In this paper, we exploit a
particular feature of the main welfare scheme in France (Revenu Minimum d￿ Insertion, RMI), namely
that childless adults under age 25 are not eligible for it. Using a regression discontinuity approach and
the French micro-census data, we ￿nd that the RMI reduces the employment of uneducated single
men by 7% ￿ 10%. Important policy implications are drawn.
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Welfare systems and labor market policies in continental Europe have compared unfavorably to their
counterparts in the UK and the US with respect to their labor markets￿performance. In particular, a
set of generous redistributive schemes (and often a lack of activation policies) have often been blamed for
contributing to persistent unemployment in France and Germany especially (cf., Laroque and SalaniØ,
2002). The French guaranteed minimum income, Revenu Minimum d￿ Insertion (RMI), is maybe one of
the most representative schemes in this respect. The RMI was implemented in 1989 in response to mass
unemployment and increased poverty in France. Designed as an income maintenance program to any
adult citizen above 24 falling into poverty, it is time-unlimited and practically unconditional on any job
search criteria or training. Bene￿ciaries are usually in a position to work, in contrast to the disabled
or the elderly who receive other speci￿c transfers. The number of "RMIsts" quickly expanded after its
introduction and has oscillated around the one million mark since 1999 (cf. ￿gure 6 in the Appendix).
The scheme currently concerns more than three million people when dependent relatives of the recipients
are accounted for. The RMI has thus quickly become a permanent form of income replacement for those
who cannot qualify for the traditional unemployment insurance schemes, either because their contribution
spells are too short or because they have exhausted their rights to these schemes. While there is no doubt
that the RMI has a very large anti-poverty impact, it has also been accused of generating inactivity traps
by dramatically reducing the gains to work for low-wage families (cf., Bourguignon, 1997).
Yet the extent or even the existence of this phenomenon has yet to be conclusively proven. In the
empirical literature, most of the evidence for the potential disincentive e⁄ect of the RMI has been provided
through estimations of structural labor supply models along with wage estimations. Laroque and SalaniØ
(2002) ￿nd signi￿cant labor supply elasticities and potential disincentive e⁄ects amongst married women
and single mothers. Gurgand and Margolis (2008) estimate monetary incentives for a representative
sample of RMIsts. Although they ￿nd that potential gains to work are small on average, the conclusions
of their study tend to minimize the inactivity trap explanation, except for single mothers. Notably in the
French context, evaluation based on structural models has rarely been validated against experimental or
quasi-experimental approaches. The main di¢ culty was the lack of a radical change in the RMI structure
that could be exploited.1 The only natural experiment we are aware of concerns the Allocation Parentale
d￿ Education, a replacement income for mothers of at least two children. Exploiting the extension of
this scheme, Piketty (1997, 1998) ￿nd a relatively elastic female labor supply, reinforcing the view that
disincentive e⁄ects are potentially large for this demographic group.
1The elasticity of transition into employment has been extensively studied in other countries. For instance in the US,
Eissa and Liebman (1996) and Liebman (1996) used the large extensions of the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) in the
late 1980s and early 1990s as a natural experiment. These reforms of the EITC made work more ￿nancially attractive for
those with at least two dependent children. The authors ￿nd a signi￿cant increase in the employment rate for this group
compared to others. In terms of experimentation, the most convincing attempt has to be the Canadian Self-Su¢ cieny
Project (cf., Card and Robbins, 1996).
1Whether single men, who make up the core group of RMI recipients in France, are also concerned by
labor supply e⁄ects remains to be seen.2 In this paper, we suggest a strategy for analyzing the potential
disincentive e⁄ect of the RMI on employment among this group. We exploit an interesting feature of the
scheme, namely the fact that childless adults under age 25 are not eligible for the RMI. This threshold
provides a natural setting for analyzing the impact of the program using a regression discontinuity (RD)
approach. The technique does not consist of studying a change of policy over time but a break in
the existing policy at age 25. This means that, contrary to natural experiments, the evaluation is not
muddled up by simultaneous changes in other policies or the economic environment. Thus, under the
condition that agents cannot manipulate the ￿ forcing variable￿ , RD estimates are as credible as those from
a randomized experiment since assignment to treatment is as ￿ good as random￿in the neighborhood of
the discontinuity (see Hahn et al., 2001, Lee, 2008, Lee and Lemieux, 2009).
Our demonstration proceeds in three steps. In section 2, we ￿rst calculate ￿nancial returns to work for
di⁄erent educational levels and show that junior school dropouts should be the primary group of interest.
Then we use the French Labor Force Survey (LFS) to investigate the employment trends over time and the
take-up pattern of the RMI at di⁄erent age levels. We obtain preliminary evidence that transition from
employment to RMI occurs more frequently at age 25 than at any other age. The third and main part
of our analysis is an application of the RD approach to the 1999 French census by exploiting the sharp
discontinuity in the RMI scheme. We ￿nd convincing evidence that the RMI reduces the employment
rate among uneducated single men at age 25. Interestingly, groups not a⁄ected by the threshold at this
age (e.g., lone parents, uneducated men observed prior to the introduction of the RMI) and those less
likely to respond to the treatment (high-education groups) do not show any e⁄ect.
The implications of these ￿ndings are potentially important for researchers and policy analysts. First
of all, our results are in line with those of Lemieux and Milligan (2008) who exploit a similar feature of
the Canadian system.3 The main di⁄erence is that we check here the e⁄ect of the entire scheme on labor
market outcomes rather than a change in the generosity of the transfer. Therefore we can attempt to
quantify (at least locally) the size of the inactivity trap generated by the RMI program. Secondly, the
e⁄ect is signi￿cant for a speci￿c group ￿junior school dropouts ￿but not for young adults with at least
some education. Such identi￿cation of the group at risk potentially has important policy implications.
Finally, from a broader perspective, the paper contributes to the (sparse) literature on male labor supply
at the extensive margin. Interestingly, our ￿ndings con￿rm the results of structural estimations that point
to higher employment elasticities among unskilled men (Aaberge et al. 1999, and Meghir and Phillips,
2In the labor supply literature, income and wage elasticities of hours are close to zero for men (see the survey of Blundell
and MaCurdy, 1999). Men usually work full time so the interesting margin is participation. Yet, there is little evidence
about participation elasticities for males, especially singles, in the literature (see the recent overview by Meghir and Phillips,
2008).
3The authors exploit the fact that before 1989, childless recipients under 30 years of age in Quebec received much lower
bene￿ts than recipients over the age of 30. They ￿nd strong evidence that more generous transfers reduce employment.
Fortin et al. (2004) have also studied the e⁄ect of the 1989 change in bene￿ts levels on welfare duration of various groups
of single claimants. For France, Terracol (2008) studies the impact of the RMI on the hazard rate out of unemployment.
22008). As argued above, this is all the more important as this group constitutes the majority of social
assistance recipients in countries like France.
2 Describing the Potential Inactivity Trap
2.1 Social Assistance in France
The French guaranteed minimum income (RMI) is paid at the household level and complements
the total net resources of the household, denoted Y , up to a maximum level B(n) which depends on
household size n according to an explicit equivalence scale, as per table 1. That is, the RMI paid is
equal to max(0;B(n) ￿ Y )). Resources Y include all incomes of all household members, net of taxes
and social security contributions as well as all other social and family bene￿ts received by the household,
with the exception of housing subsidies. The latter are introduced as a lump-sum amount that depends
on household characteristics and represents between 12% and 17% of the maximum RMI amount B(n):
Table 1 shows that the redistributive e⁄ect of the scheme is potentially large, lifting people with no
resources up to a level close to the o¢ cial poverty line. Yet the di⁄erential nature of the RMI generates
a 100% implicit marginal tax rate on earnings up to B(n).4 The RMI can be claimed by anyone resident
in France, at least 25 years of age and not in education. Importantly, the age condition does not apply
to those in charge of dependent children living in the household. In addition to the transfer itself, a
RMI recipient is automatically entitled to additional bene￿ts, including a full exemption from the local
residence tax (Taxe d￿ Habitation), access to free universal healthcare insurance (Couverture MØdicale
Universelle) and lower fares on public transport. Although entitlement to RMI is in principle conditional
on an "integration" contract (Contrat d￿ Insertion), in practice it does not include any obligation to
actively seek work.
The French welfare system is structured in such a way that the RMI acts as a last resort bene￿t for
those who are ineligible for other schemes. The unemployed workers who have made su¢ cient contribu-
tions can receive unemployment bene￿ts (UB) upon losing their job. After exhausting their entitlement
to the UB, they are entitled to a means-tested social bene￿t (Allocation de SolidaritØ SpØci￿que, ASS)
for two years under certain conditions. Speci￿c minimum income schemes exist for disabled workers
(Allocation aux Adultes HandicapØs) and pensioners (Minimum vieillesse). For lone parents, a speci￿c
minimum income is available for one year or until the last child reaches the age of three (Allocation de
Parent IsolØ, API). The API is calculated in the same way as the RMI but the maximum theoretical
amount is slightly larger. The RMI covers all other situations, including those who have exhausted their
right to other bene￿ts. The RMI is often complemented by means-tested housing subsidies, which can
4Note however that with the intØressement measures introduced in 1997, a RMI bene￿ciary can partly cumulate earnings
and the RMI for some time. Precisely, the implicit marginal tax rate is reduced to 50% for the ￿rst 750 hours worked (see
HagnerØ and Trannoy, 2001, for a thorough assessment). Note that in 1999, the main year of interest in the rest of our
study, the intØressement measure concerned only a limited number of RMI recipients. According to the LFS, only 8% of
all RMI recipients were simultaneously recipients and employed.
3represent up to a third of the total transfer to those living purely on welfare. These bene￿ts have di⁄erent
schedules that depend on the rent or the interest paid, the size of the dwelling, taxable income and the
number of children in the household.
The interesting feature of the French system for the purpose of this paper is the fact that under the
age of 25, childless individuals who are able to work are not entitled to social assistance payments, with
the exception of housing subsidies. The availability of the RMI at age 25 thus represents an important
shock to the budget constraint as illustrated below.








in % of poverty
line**
Single household 0 454 704 0.91
1 682 943 0.93
2 818 1,090 0.88
per extra child 182 192
Couple household 0 682 995 0.85
1 818 1,178 0.84
2 955 1,341 0.82
per extra child 182 192
Source: Caisse Nationale des Allocations Familiales, 2008. Figures are rounded up to the nearest Euro.
* Household disposable income by cumulating RMI and housing subsidies
** Equivalized income using modified OECD scale; poverty line calculated as 50% median (EUR 1,550 in 2008)
2.2 Budget Constraints
Figure 1 depicts budget constraints for single individuals with high and low education levels. Dis-
posable income is computed on the basis of gross income (weekly hours times wage rate) and household
characteristics, using a tax-bene￿t microsimulation model to calculate all direct taxes, social contribu-
tions and transfers. We use the median wage for each education group as drawn from a sample of single
men aged 20-35 taken from the Labor Force Survey (cf., ￿rst row of table 7 in the Appendix). The
￿rst type corresponds to the lowest education level, referred to as "junior school dropout" in what fol-
lows.5 The second type is a college-educated person. The graph starts with a horizontal plateau that
corresponds to welfare payments (RMI and housing subsidies) and that characterizes the inactivity trap.
Beyond this zone, the slope is increasing and becomes steeper for higher wage/education levels. Adding
an indi⁄erence curve to the graph clearly illustrates that di⁄erent productivities lead to contrasting labor
5In France, education is compulsory until age 16. This age normally corresponds to the end of the ￿rst cycle of highschool,
which is examined with the Dipl￿me National du Brevet. In practice, students who have repeated one or several years of
school and reach age 16 before sitting this exam may leave school. "Junior school dropouts" are those who do not pass
the Brevet and quit the education system without any diploma (they hold a Certi￿cat d￿ Etudes Primaires). They are
essentially comparable to High School dropouts in the US.
4supply choices. All else equal (and in particular preferences), the uneducated worker is induced to leave
the labor market upon becoming eligible for the RMI at age 25 while a college-educated person will work
(around 35 hours per week in our example). Before 25, the junior school dropout receives only housing
subsidies at zero hours (point A); a similar individual aged 25 attains a level of disposable income 162%
higher thanks to the RMI (point B).
To get a better idea of the potential disincentive e⁄ect at the extensive margin, we calculate the
relative gains to work. This is de￿ned as the percentage increase in disposable income upon moving
from inactivity (and receiving the RMI) to part/full time work. This calculation is performed for single
men aged 20-35 at di⁄erent education levels, as reported in table 7 in the Appendix. It turns out that
for junior school dropouts, the median relative gain is close to zero for a part-time job. It is larger for
a full-time job (just over 60%) but this only corresponds to an additional EUR 370 per month, which
may be partly reduced by costs of work (e.g., transportation costs). The gains become more signi￿cant
with higher educational attainment.6 These results indicate clearly that when the 25 year old mark has
been passed, people may react very di⁄erently to the treatment "availability of the RMI" depending on
their potential returns on the labor market. Table 7 also shows the distribution of single men according
to educational attainment and compares it to the distribution of those receiving the RMI. It is clear
that junior school dropouts are over-represented among RMI recipients (52%) compared to the overall
population (22%). All of the other groups are proportionally under-represented. The group of junior
school dropouts appears to be most at risk of succumbing to the inactivity trap and is therefore the focus
of our attention in the rest of the paper.
Interestingly, the RD approach suggested in this paper provides an informal test of the two predictions
made by the static labor supply model in ￿gure 1. First, individuals with very low potential wages
should drop out of the labor market once they reach age 25 and become eligible for the RMI. Second, the
adjustment should take place at the extensive (participation) margin as opposed to the intensive margin
(hours of work conditional on participating). Quite clearly, however, such a simple model imposes strong
restrictions on rationality. Even in a static framework, it is possible to explain why some people work
despite small (or negative) ￿nancial gains. In particular, work (or at least the ￿rst hours of work) may
provide some well-being through social inclusion while inactivity may carry speci￿c disutility due to the
stigma of living on welfare assistance. It is also possible to depart from the assumption of static rationality
made in most policy evaluations (e.g., Blundell et al., 2000).7 In what follows, we attempt to quantify
6Other groups include those people who opt for a two-year apprenticeship (Certi￿cat d￿ Aptitude Professionnelle and
Brevet d￿ Etudes Professionnelles), those who complete highschool and students who pursue college or higher university
education.
7If agents are forward-looking, they will anticipate human capital accumulation and higher future wages. Yet there is no
clear evidence that they do so (see Meghir and Phillips, 2008, for a recent survey on dynamic labor supply estimations) or
that future wage prospects are high enough. Guillemot et al. (2002) argue that dynamic aspects may not be very relevant;
they report that RMIsts who re-enter the labor market are usually in precarious situations, holding subsidized and time-
limited jobs and having a higher chance of becoming unemployed the following year. To refute the existence of inactivity












































Junior school dropout (age<25)
A
B
Sources: budget constraints of childless single individuals, simulated using the microsimulation model SYSIFF and taking the mean wage of each
educational group  as basis for the simulations (mean value obtained from the Labor Force Survey).
Figure 1: Representative Budget Constraints
the number of workers for whom ￿nancial disincentives are strong enough ￿or the taste for work, stigma
and intertemporal substitution e⁄ects are small enough ￿to generate negative employment e⁄ects.
3 Data and Selection
Labor Force Survey
The ￿rst dataset we use is the French Labor Force Survey (LFS), which was conducted on an annual
basis for the periods 1982-1989 and 1990-2002 by the French Statistical O¢ ce (Institut de la Statistique
et des Etudes Economiques, INSEE). For cross-sectional use, the annual LFS is a large representative
sample of the French population aged 15 or over (sampling rate: 1/300). It provides information on
employment, incomes, education and demographics. The LFS is also a rotating panel: each household
remains in the survey for three consecutive years with one third being replaced each year. In the next
section, we use the LFS primarily to document the long-term trends in the labor market behavior of our
target population. We also use the panel dimension to describe movements into RMI at di⁄erent age
levels.
Census data
The RD analysis is based on the French census data, which is publicly available from INSEE. The
coverage of the census is universal. Two sizes of dataset are available. Since the RD approach requires a
large sample size, we opt for the larger census which samples one quarter of the population (around 14.5
million people). The sample provides data on age (in day), employment, type of contract, work duration,
6marital status and household type.8 We use the 1999 census data in our main RD estimations, that is,
ten years after the implementation of the RMI. We shall also use the 1982 census data as a control group
hereafter.
For the main RD analysis, we focus on single men without children. Most importantly, (childless)
single individuals represent the main group of claimants, i.e., around 58% of all RMIsts.9 Another reason
for this choice is that the joint labor supply decision in couples is more complicated and does not provide
as clear evidence as with singles. The selection of individuals without children is obviously due to the
fact that a parent is eligible for the RMI regardless of his/her age.10 However, we carefully investigate
the possible selection bias implied by focusing on childless single men and replicate the RD analysis for
a broader group of men hereafter. The selection on males is motivated by the fact that a larger fraction
of women have children at age 25 and hence are not subject to the age restriction.11 Moreover, women
are more at risk of being a⁄ected by the possible selection bias engendered by choosing only childless
persons; they are also more concerned by potential fertility responses to ￿nancial incentives. We discuss
these and other possible manipulation e⁄ects in detail below.
As justi￿ed in the previous section, junior school dropouts constitute our target group as they are the
most at risk of ￿nancial disincentives. With the quarter census, we can create cells of a su¢ ciently large
size for robust analysis. Table 8 in the Appendix shows that there are more than 74;000 observations
for each year of age. Junior school dropouts represent between 10% and 15% of all men, leading to cells
of more than 4;000 observations per age group when childless singles are selected. Note also that we
restrict our analysis to the group aged between 20￿35 for the main RD estimation results. Considering
individuals under the age of 20 could lead to less robust results as we would encounter less and less people
in each age cell. Not all junior school dropouts leave the education system at age 16 as some of them
may repeat one or more years of school.12 The upper bound (35 years of age) is arbitrarily chosen but
we perform sensitivity analysis on the age window in what follows.
4 Social Assistance and Employment: Some Evidence using La-
bor Force Surveys
Before using the LFS, we rely on o¢ cial statistics to describe the trends on the French labor market.
Figure 6 in the Appendix illustrates the sharp increase in unemployment (ILO de￿nition) in the 1990s,
8Data on income, past year employment and receipt/amount of RMI or other bene￿ts is unfortunately not available.
9The population of RMI recipients is decomposed as follows: 38% are single men, 20% are single women, 13% are lone
parents with one child, 12% are lone parents with more than one child and the rest are couples with or without children
(13% and 4% respectively)
10We refer to people as ￿ childless￿or ￿ without children￿when they either do not have children or have children but do not
live with them:
11In France, women have their children at a younger age than men. Women are also much more likely than men to be
single parents.
12Importantly, note that our selection excludes all those who are still at school or in some form of education.
7accompanied by a dramatic increase in the number of people on welfare following the introduction of the
RMI in 1989. Notice that only around a third of the RMI recipients are registered as job seekers and are
hence accounted for in the ILO-de￿ned unemployment ￿gures.
The rapid expansion of the number of RMIsts in the ￿rst half of the 1990s re￿ ects the downturn in
the economic situation during this period but also the increased generosity of the scheme, which ensures
that more people qualify, and the stricter rules governing unemployment insurance following its 1992-93
reform. The economic recovery of the 1997-2001 period is characterized by declining unemployment but
this has not fully trickled down to the poorest levels. E⁄ectively, while unemployment has returned to
the level of the late 1980s, the number of RMIsts has declined with a delay and only temporarily. Many
reasons have been invoked. On the demand side, the RMI status is negatively perceived by employers
so that recipients are among the last to re-enter the labor market during upturns. On the supply side,
it is possible that claiming behavior has changed due to lower participation costs, better information on
the availability of the bene￿t or lower social stigma associated with the claim.13 This may in turn a⁄ect
labor market participation as argued below.
Next, we use the LFS to graph the long-term trends in employment for single males around the
discontinuity at age 25. A three-year moving average is used to smooth the series. Results are reported in
￿gure 2, plotted by broad educational groups. The top two lines trace the employment rate for 20-24 year
olds and 25-30 year olds with some education (vocational training, highschool or university education).
These two groups follow the business cycle, with employment decreasing until the mid-1990s and picking
up in the second half of the decade. Yet the younger group shows larger ￿ uctuations, in particular falling
more rapidly with the downturn of the early 1990s, and is always distinguished by a lower employment
rate. This is in line with known results about the French labor market, and in particular the existence
of a high universal minimum wage which encourages the exclusion of the youngest workers (see Abowd
et al., 1999, Cahuc et al., 2008).14 The second set of lines shows the employment rate for junior school
dropouts aged 20-24 and 25-30. These two age groups do not follow each other as closely as those with
education do. The 25-30 year olds show a gradual decline in employment, in marked contrast to their
younger counterparts who closely track the business cycle. This suggests that the availability of the
RMI for the former age group has incited a labor supply response and resigned this group to a more
permanent level of under-employment; this is especially the case during the 1990s period characterized
by the continued expansion of the RMI.15
13Sociological studies point toward a self-reinforcing process whereby the number of claimants a⁄ects the perceived
normality of the claim and the propensity to take-up in the following years (see Mood, 2004). See Terracol (2003) on the
take-up of RMI in France.
14Young workers (outsiders) are judged less productive than the level at which the minimum wage is negotiated by other,
older workers. As a result, France has one of the lowest employment rates of 20-24 year olds in the OECD (cf., Cahuc et
al., 2008).
15Admittedly, this evidence is not concrete as there may be di⁄erent responses to macroeconomic shocks for di⁄erent age
groups. If this was the case, however, we would expect it to happen for the two higher-educated age groups too. It clearly
does not, which suggests that those with some education are much less a⁄ected by the RMI, as shall be demonstrated in





























single, age 25-30, JS dropouts
single, age 20-24, JS dropouts
single, age 25-30, some education
single, age 20-24, some education
Figure 2: Employment Trends
Finally, we exploit the (rotating) panel dimension of the LFS 1990-2002 to track people who take up
the RMI at some stage during their observation. We de￿ne "new RMIsts" as those observed as recipients
in year N and not in year N-1.16 To keep the largest possible sample, we include men and women from
all educational groups and family types. However, we only keep individuals who are observed at least
twice and for whom we have complete information on employment and RMI status. This represents an
attrition rate of 24% on average over the period 1990-2002.
We are interested in the relationship between age and movement into RMI as reported in ￿gure 3.
The ￿rst observation is that the number of RMIsts (as a % of the active population of each age cell)
reaches a peak at age 25-27, then decreases gradually with age and is relatively stable after 35. The
over-representation of young workers among RMI recipients is the result of a number of factors including
higher risk of unemployment and low UB coverage for this population. Furthermore, ￿gure 3 shows
that the proportion of "new RMIsts" (as a % of all RMIsts in each age cell) is at its maximum at age
25,17 then decreases sharply and oscillates between 30% and 40%. As expected, an important fraction
of the movers at age 25 were unemployed in the previous year, probably uncovered by UB and hence
"waiting" for the RMI. Yet the bottom line of ￿gure 3 shows that 12% of the new entries at age 25 were
employed the year before. Importantly, this proportion decreases after 25 and stabilizes at around 7% of
all recipients at each other age level. We interpret these results as follows: among the 12% at age 25, 7
percentage points (ppt) correspond to people a⁄ected by a recent unemployment shock and 5 points to
16Naturally, movements in and out of the RMI status may be more frequent, but the interval provided in the LFS panel
does not allow thinner time decomposition. Note also that since we follow people for three years at most, each individual
can be classi￿ed as a new RMIst at most once.
17It is around two third of all RMIsts, the remaining third corresponding to "old RMIsts", i.e., those with children who
received the RMI under 25.
9people who may have stopped working to take up the RMI at age 25. These results are suggestive but
su⁄er from the small sample size of the LFS (sampling rate of 1/300) and the fact that RMI recipients

















































































































Proportion of new RMIsts
Proportion of new RMIsts (employed in N-1)
Proportion of new RMIsts (unemployed in N-1)
No of RMIsts
Figure 3: Proportion of "new" RMI Recipients
5 A Regression Discontinuity Analysis
5.1 RMI, What Else?
Before we turn to the RD design, we check that no signi￿cant discontinuity, other than the age
break in the eligibility for the RMI, exists that could explain a negative employment e⁄ect at age 25.
We investigate three main areas: labor market regulations, the tax-bene￿t structure and parents￿legal
obligations to ￿nancially support their children.
Regarding the labor market, active labor market policies related to youth employment were in place in
1999, notably public employment schemes for low-skilled unemployed young adults (e.g., Contrat Emploi
SolidaritØ, CES), newly introduced subsidized job schemes (Contrats Emplois Jeunes, launched in 1997)
and private contracts associated with subsidized on-the-job training (e.g., Contrat de Quali￿cation).
However, the di⁄erent schemes concerned young workers aged under 26 so that any break in employment
￿gures would occur at 26 rather than 25. Another important policy concerns payroll tax subsidies for
minimum wage workers but these subsidies are de￿ned according to wage rate levels and make no reference
to age. All of these measures and their employment e⁄ects are described in FougŁre et al. (2000).
Examining the tax-bene￿t system, the only important issue that emerges is the possibility for parents
to declare children as dependent in order to obtain tax deductions or bene￿t increments. Children can be
10treated as dependent only until age 21 in the bene￿t system. The only exception is the RMI itself, i.e.,
parents receiving the RMI obtain an increment for the presence of children aged 21-24; yet this applies
only if the child is a student, and hence does not concern our target group of junior school dropouts. As
for the tax system, tax deductions are linked to the legal obligation of parents to ￿nancially take care of
their children until their 25th birthday. A possible consequence is the decrease in intra-family transfers
in the direction of children when they reach 25, accentuated by a decrease in total household income
(as parents do no longer bene￿t from the increment of RMI, if recipients, or from the tax deduction, if
tax payers). Clearly, this cannot explain a drop in employment at age 25. Admittedly, however, it may
reduce the employment e⁄ect of the RMI as captured in what follows. Finally, a decrease in parental
transfer and the possibility of taking up the RMI at age 25 may induce changes in living arrangements.
However, we ￿nd no statistical evidence of a discontinuity in cohabitation rates with parents at age 25.
The proportion of cohabitants is reported in the last column of table 8. Potential changes in living
arrangements with partners and children receive speci￿c attention in section 5.8.
5.2 Empirical Approach
Using census data, we now exploit the discontinuity in the RMI scheme at age 25. Consider the
regression model:
Yia = ￿0 + ￿1TREATia + ￿(a) + "ia (1)
where Yia is an outcome variable for individual i of age a. The main outcome we focus on hereafter is labor
supply (either participation or hours of work). The e⁄ect of age (the forcing variable) on the outcome
variable is captured by the function ￿(a) while TREATia is a treatment dummy that takes value 1 if the
individual is aged 25 or above and zero otherwise. This way, we can estimate the e⁄ect ￿1 of the treatment
(the potential availability of the RMI) on the outcome variable. The key identi￿cation assumption of
the RD approach is that ￿(￿) is a continuous function. Under this assumption, the treatment e⁄ect ￿1
is obtained by estimating the discontinuity in the empirical regression function at the point where the
forcing variable switches from 0 to 1 (age 25 in our case).18
The main argument for assuming that ￿(￿) is a smooth function is that labor supply variables typ-
ically exhibit regular age pro￿les. Function ￿(￿) should certainly be ￿ exible enough to accommodate
nonlinearities in the age pro￿les, but there is no reason ￿in human capital or related theories of behavior
over the lifecycle ￿to expect an abrupt change in labor supply at age 25. Moreover, we have argued
that no other discontinuity embedded in redistributive or labor market policies could explain a negative
employment e⁄ect at that particular age. Nevertheless, several robustness checks are provided in what
follows.19 In particular, we shall investigate any bias due to the selection of single individuals without
18We would like to include additional control variables in our regressions but the target group is already homogenous
in terms of education level and marital status. The region of residence could be added to proxy the local employment
opportunities, but this information is not available in the 1/4 selection of the Census data.
19We rule out the possibility that people "cheat" on their age, as this information is easily and systematically veri￿ed by
11dependent children. If fertility and living arrangements decisions are endogenous, the target group of our
main analysis could indeed present a problem of non-random selection. The important point is to check
whether the bias is itself is a smooth function of age. If it is, it will be accounted for by function ￿(￿) and
the RD approach remains valid.
Age is available in days so that we know exactly what age people are at census day and their em-
ployment status at that date. Consequently, and because the treatment variable (labor supply) is a
deterministic function of the forcing variable (age), this is a ￿sharp￿RD design.
We do not use age in days to perform the RD estimation for two reasons. Firstly, it is not clear
when the potential labor supply response would occur after turning 25. Individuals who were working
before their 25th birthday may not be aware that the RMI is means-tested on the income earned during
the three months prior to the claim. Secondly, age cells obtained when age is measured in days are too
small for any meaningful analysis and would display a very erratic pattern. Rather, in order to reduce
the amount of noise, our parametric analysis makes use of age in years and quarters. The problem is
thus one where the forcing variable is discrete and all the information is summarized in the age-speci￿c
means of the variables, a situation extensively discussed in Lee and Card (2008). This way, estimates of
equation (1) based on individual data are identical to estimates of the age-cell version of the model:
Ya = ￿0 + ￿1TREATa + ￿(a) + "a; (2)
weighted by the number of observations by age group.
In the discrete case, the treatment e⁄ect is not identi￿ed non-parametrically (cf. Lee and Card,
2008). Indeed, a discrete dependent variable means that we cannot compare observations "close enough"
on both sides of the cuto⁄ point to be able to identify the e⁄ect. Hence we rely on various parametric
functions of the forcing variable a in order to balance the usual trade-o⁄ between precision and bias. We
use a variety of polynomial forms, including standard linear, quadratic, and cubic functions, as well as
linear and quadratic splines (separate regressions on both sides of the discontinuity). Inconveniently, this
approach provides global estimates of the regression function over all values of the forcing variable, while
the RD design depends instead on local estimates of the regression function at the cuto⁄ point. Thus
we also present estimates of the linear spline model for an increasingly small window around age 25 as a
further robustness check.
We use di⁄erent measures to check how well the polynomial models ￿t the data. Denote J the number
of age years/quarters and K the number of parameters estimated in function ￿(￿). Since the outcome
variable Ya is a cell mean, its sampling variance Va can be easily computed. Under the assumption that
speci￿cation (2) is correct, the only source of error in the model should be the sampling error. This







bene￿t agencies. Nonetheless, the procedure of McCrary (2008) is applied below to test any possible manipulation of the
forcing variable.
12Under the null hypothesis that model (2) is the true model, GOF1 should follow a ￿2 distribution with
J ￿ K degrees of freedom. The fact that the forcing variable is discrete also provides a natural way of
testing whether the regression model is well speci￿ed by comparing the ￿tted model to the raw dispersion
in mean outcomes at each value of the variable. Lee and Card (2008) show that the speci￿cation can be
tested using the statistic:
GOF2 =
(ESSR ￿ ESSUR)=(J ￿ K)
ESSUR=(N ￿ J)
where ESSR is the estimated error sum of squares of the model (2) while ESSUR is the estimated error
sum of squares of a model where a full set of dummy variables for the J values of the forcing variable
are included. In this unrestricted model, the ￿tted regression corresponds to the mean outcome in each
cell. Under normality and heteroskedasticity of "a, GOF2 follows a F(J ￿ K;N ￿ J) distribution where
N is the number of observations. This is not a de￿nitive test ￿Lee and Card note that rejection of a
given polynomial form ￿(￿) does not necessarily imply that the corresponding estimate of the e⁄ect is
inconsistent ￿but con￿dence in a chosen speci￿cation increases if it cannot be rejected by this test.20
Complementary to the parametric approach, we treat age in months as continuous in order to perform
nonparametric estimations. We use local linear regressions, advocated to reduce the bias inherent to
nonparametric regressions at boundary points (Hahn et al., 2001). We have experimented with di⁄erent
types of kernel functions including the triangular kernel, known to be optimal for estimating local linear
regressions at the boundary (Fan and Gijbels, 1996), and the rectangular kernel with various bandwidths.
Using a variety of bandwidths is important in order to balance precision and bias. Standard errors are
obtained by bootstrapping.
5.3 Regression Discontinuity: Graphical Results
Before looking at statistical results, we present graphical evidence of a drop in the conditional mean
of the outcome at the 25 year-old threshold. As argued by Imbens and Lemieux (2008), the graphical
representation of the discontinuity should be an integral part of any RD analysis. No evidence of that
sort would cast serious doubt on the more sophisticated statistical analysis that follows.
We use the 1999 census to plot the raw employment rates by age, along with the 95% level con￿dence
bounds, for single male junior school dropouts. For age in years, ￿gure 4 suggests that employment drops
sharply at age 25, that is, when people become eligible for the RMI. Figure 5 presents the same result
with age in quarters but displays slightly more noise due to smaller age cells. Both graphs con￿rm that
the drop in the outcome variable at the cuto⁄ is unusually large compared to other bumps in the curve
away from the cuto⁄.
20Lee and Card (2008) also interpret the di⁄erence between the true conditional expectation and the estimated regression
function (forming the basis of the GOF2 test) as a random speci￿cation error that introduces a group structure into the
standard errors. Correcting for group structure can be done by ￿clustering￿ standard errors in model (1) or simply by
running the model on weighted cell means, i.e., model (2). The GOF2 test can be interpreted as a test of whether standard
errors should be adjusted for group structure.
13The steep upward trend in employment rates before the discontinuity is in line with the widely
accepted theory that the employment rate is a concave function of age. In the French context, however,
this also corresponds to the higher discrimination against the youngest workers, as discussed in the
previous section. This pattern of increasing employment before 25 is also observed for other groups (e.g.,
lone mothers, cf. ￿gure 8 in the Appendix, or broader male groups, cf. ￿gure 11). The relatively ￿ at
trend observed for the segment 25-35 is driven by the nature of the group of interest, namely men without





































Figure 4: Employment Rate of Single Male JS Dropouts (Census 1999, Age in Years)
5.4 Regression Discontinuity Estimates
We now turn to the main regression results presented in table 2. We ￿rst focus on the estimated
treatment e⁄ect on the employment rates of our group of interest in 1999, i.e., single male junior school
dropouts aged 20-35. The employment impact is accurately estimated for all ￿ exible speci￿cations of
￿(￿). The treatment is not signi￿cant when using the linear form, which may be too restrictive given the
di⁄erent slopes on each side of the discontinuity point in ￿gure 4. The treatment e⁄ect is more precisely
estimated with age in years but results are very similar when using either years or quarters. In ppt of
the employment rate, all models give an e⁄ect of magnitude between ￿6:9 and ￿4:9. When accounting
for standard errors, these e⁄ects are not statistically di⁄erent from one another. E⁄ects expressed in ppt
can be divided by the average employment rate (68%) to give the proportion of people concerned by the
disincentive e⁄ect at the discontinuity, i.e., between 7:2% and 10:2% of our selected target group.21
21Thus, since junior school dropouts represent around half of the RMIsts (cf., table 7), the inactivity trap roughly concern
































Figure 5: Employment Rate of Single Male JS Dropouts (Census 1999, Age in Quarters)
Goodness-of-￿t measures suggest that all models ￿t the data very well; the two measures GOF1 and
GOF2 actually lead to very similar results. In table 2, the p-values are reported for all ￿ exible models
and show that we cannot reject these models at reasonable signi￿cance levels.
The last two columns of table 2 report the treatment e⁄ect for another labor supply measure, namely
the number of work hours at census week (including zeros). The e⁄ect of the RMI is signi￿cant for all
the ￿ exible measures and is located in the range [￿2:7;￿1:9]. This represents between 7:3% and 10:6%
of the average hours of work (25:5), which is very similar to the aforementioned e⁄ect on employment
probability. This suggests that all of the impact of the RMI on labor supply happens at the extensive
margin, as predicted by the simple static labor supply model.
In addition to labor supply variables, we also exploit information on work contracts. Those who stop
working at 25 may have unobserved characteristics that also lead to a weaker attachment to the labor
market. Also, they may anticipate the possibility of living on welfare at 25 and provide minimum search
e⁄ort, i.e., do not attempt to ￿nd long-term or tenured positions. If this is the case, we expect to see
a drop in the proportion of short-term contracts among uneducated workers at age 25. We ￿nd that
this is indeed the case (detailed results are available upon request). For the estimations based on age in
quarters, the treatment e⁄ect is signi￿cant for all speci￿cations. When using age in years, the e⁄ect is
signi￿cant for all speci￿cations but the quadratic spline. The drop in the number of short-term contracts
(in % of all contracts) is in a range between 2:3 and 4 ppt across the di⁄erent speci￿cations. We discuss
the welfare implications and intertemporal aspects in the concluding section.
previous section.
15Table 2: RD Estimates of the E⁄ect of RMI on Labor supply, Single Male JS Dropouts, 1999
Mean of the dependent variable
Polynomial specification for age:
Linear -0.027 -0.028 ** -0.881 -0.918
(0.018) (0.014) (0.773) (0.573)
Quadratic -0.067 *** -0.069 *** -2.601 *** -2.700 ***
(0.013) (0.015) (0.568) (0.622)
Cubic -0.065 *** -0.067 *** -2.402 *** -2.514 ***
(0.014) (0.016) (0.594) (0.654)
Linear spline -0.049 *** -0.058 *** -1.874 *** -2.300 ***
(0.010) (0.014) (0.365) (0.536)
Quadratic spline -0.067 *** -0.068 *** -2.327 *** -2.405 ***
(0.017) (0.018) (0.719) (0.740)
Goodness of fit statistic 1 (p-value)
Quadratic 0.92 0.75 0.78 0.55
Cubic 0.88 0.73 0.78 0.55
Linear spline 0.96 0.80 0.96 0.71
Quadratic spline 0.81 0.68 0.65 0.50
Goodness of fit statistic 2 (p-value)
Quadratic 0.98 0.80 0.88 0.61
Cubic 0.97 0.77 0.89 0.60
Linear spline 1.00 0.84 1.00 0.75
Quadratic spline 0.92 0.73 0.77 0.55
Note: statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% levels are indicated by ***, ** and * respectively
0.68 25.5
Emp. Rate Weekly hours
quarters quarters years age in: years
165.5 Additional Regressions
To check the robustness of our results, we present a few additional regressions. First of all, to negate
the e⁄ect of variations at the extremes of the age range 20-35, we suggest relying only on observations
that are increasingly close to the discontinuity point. We do so using the linear spline model and report
the results in the second panel of table 3. For instance, the second row shows the results for a "￿4 years"
window (that is, for the age range 21-29). The smallest window we can use with the linear spline model is
"￿2 years" since we need at least two observations on each side to identify separate regression lines (the
R2 is equal to one in this case). Results are very robust to the age window used in the estimation, with
employment rate e⁄ects (in ppt) in the range [￿7:9;￿5:2] and hours e⁄ects in the range [￿2:8;￿1:9]: It is
reassuring to see that the magnitude of these e⁄ects is not very di⁄erent ￿and not actually statistically
di⁄erent ￿from those obtained with the 20-35 age window in the main regressions.
We also run local linear regressions for the main group (age 20-35) using age in months. These
nonparametric estimates provide additional con￿dence in the robustness of the results obtained with the
polynomial models. In the last panel of table 3, we simply report regressions obtained with a triangular
kernel and a rectangular kernel for three di⁄erent bandwidths corresponding to 1, 2 and 4 years. Estimates
are slightly larger than ￿but not statistically di⁄erent from ￿those obtained with the parametric linear
spline model. They are much less precisely estimated due to the noise in age reported in months. A larger
bandwidth decreases the variance because we include more observations and take the separate e⁄ect of
months on outcomes into account (yet it should also increase the inaccuracy of the estimated e⁄ect since
we move further away from the discontinuity).
5.6 Control Groups
We check the robustness of our regressions by inspecting the groups of people who are not a⁄ected
by the RMI. Two obvious groups emerge. The ￿rst is the same target group of single male junior school
dropouts aged 20-35, but observed in 1982, i.e., six years before the RMI was introduced. The second
is the group of single mothers who are, by de￿nition, eligible for the RMI at any age. Table 4 reveals a
marked contrast between these groups and our group of interest. The treatment e⁄ect is insigni￿cant for
each control group, regardless of the functional form.
We see con￿rmation of these results upon looking at the graphs in ￿gures 7 and 8 in the Appendix.
It is quite clear that no signi￿cant discontinuity appears at age 25 for either group. In the ￿rst graph, we
note that uneducated single men had a higher overall employment rate in 1982 than their counterparts
in 1999. This is consistent with ￿gure 2. For lone mothers, the employment-age pro￿le is very smooth so
that the absence of any discontinuity is very clear. The employment rates of these lone parents show a
fast upward trend but remain low. This group is known to have very small (or negative) ￿nancial gains
to work, possibly due to ￿xed costs of work such as childcare (Gurgand and Margolis, 2008). That is,
the RMI e⁄ect is not necessarily absent for this group but may in fact exist at all ages and explain the
17Table 3: RD Estimates: Additional Regressions
Linear spline, with age window widths:
±5 years around 25 -0.052 *** -0.058 *** -1.953 *** -2.214 ***
(0.012) (0.016) (0.446) (0.627)
±4 years around 25 -0.060 *** -0.069 *** -2.146 *** -2.504 ***
(0.009) (0.016) (0.345) (0.610)
±3 years around 25 -0.065 *** -0.072 *** -2.259 *** -2.551 ***
(0.011) (0.021) (0.487) (0.803)
±2 years around 25 -0.067 (-) -0.079 (-) -2.157 (-) -2.804 (-)
Local linear regressions, with bandwidth:
24 months (triang. kernel) -0.080 ** -3.023 **
(0.032) (1.250)
12 months (rect. kernel) -0.071 * -2.983 *
(0.040) (1.574)
24 months (rect. kernel) -0.088 *** -3.193 ***
(0.031) (1.188)
48 months (rect. kernel) -0.078 *** -2.935 ***
(0.021) (0.642)
Note: statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% levels are indicated by ***, ** and * respectively
age in: months months
age in: years quarters years quarters
Emp. Rate Weekly hours
18very low employment levels in ￿gure 8.





Linear -0.027 0.016 -0.017
(0.018) (0.019) (0.013)
Quadratic -0.067 *** -0.009 -0.003
(0.013) (0.018) (0.014)
Cubic -0.065 *** -0.003 0.002
(0.014) (0.021) (0.016)
Linear spline -0.049 *** 0.006 -0.013
(0.010) (0.018) (0.014)
Quadratic spline -0.067 *** 0.010 -0.004
(0.017) (0.023) (0.019)
Note: statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% levels are indicated by ***, ** and * respectively. Specifications with age in years.
Single male 1999 Single male 1982 Lone mothers 1999
5.7 Broader Educational Groups
We also look at single men aged 20-35 with higher educational levels than our group of interest. We
expect that broadening the target group in this way may reveal whether or not the employment e⁄ect of
the RMI is limited to junior school dropouts, as suggested by the ￿rst analysis based on the LFS above.
Results are presented in table 5.
First, it is not surprisingly to see that average employment levels for those with education are much
higher than for the target group, possibly due to a number of e⁄ects. On the supply side, educated
adults have larger ￿nancial incentives to work, as discussed in Section 2. They may also have unobserved
characteristics that explain both higher educational achievement and a stronger attachment to the labor
market. In addition, they have higher returns to seniority and hence higher (dynamic) incentives to stay
in the labor market (cf., Be⁄y et al., 2006). On the demand side, those with a degree are possibly less at
risk of being rationed out of the market because of the minimum wage; a degree may also protect them
to some extent from other (frictional) unemployment.
Next, we expect the treatment e⁄ect to be smaller for higher educated men. This is due to the
supply-side reasons suggested above (larger earnings prospects, unobserved heterogeneity, higher return
to seniority). Also, part of the demand-side explanations above may result in higher job search costs
for low educated individuals (discouraged workers). Results reported in table 5 show no signi￿cant
treatment e⁄ect for educated workers. The lack of discontinuity at age 25 is particularly interesting for
those with a vocational degree. We have seen in table 7 (Appendix) that their ￿nancial gains to work
19are on average not much larger than that of junior school dropouts. So we surmise that the role of
unobserved characteristics and job search costs in explaining the inactivity trap is potentially large. This
is reinforced by the observation that unemployment rates are much smaller for this group compared to
junior school dropouts (cf., bottom rows of table 7). The policy implications of these results are discussed
in the concluding section.
Table 5: Employment E⁄ect: Broadening the Target Group to Higher Education Levels
Specification for age
Mean emp. rate
0.68 0.84 0.88 0.92
Regression discontinuity estimates
Linear -0.027 0.002 0.015 0.011 *
(0.018) (0.007) (0.010) (0.006)
Quadratic -0.067 *** -0.004 0.001 -0.005
(0.013) (0.009) (0.011) (0.005)
Cubic -0.065 *** -0.005 0.009 -0.006
(0.014) (0.010) (0.007) (0.004)
Linear spline -0.049 *** -0.002 0.005 0.004
(0.010) (0.008) (0.006) (0.004)
Quadratic spline -0.067 *** -0.007 0.017 -0.002
(0.017) (0.012) (0.010) (0.004)
Note: statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% levels are indicated by ***, ** and * respectively.
Estimates are based on age in years. Selected sample: single men without children.
Junior school
dropouts
Apprenticeship Highschool University degree
5.8 Testing Possible "Manipulation" E⁄ects
The question of sample selectivity, due to the fact that we consider only single men without children,
is an issue if "manipulation" e⁄ects are possible. In our context, fertility decisions might be directly
in￿ uenced by the generosity of social assistance transfers. That is, some people may decide to have
children in order to become eligible for welfare assistance before 25.22 It is reasonable to assume that
this e⁄ect is relatively limited for single men. Table 8 in the Appendix shows that the proportion of
single males with children (among junior school dropouts) is very small under age 25, from 1% at age
20 to 7% at age 24. For men in couples, however, we would like to check whether or not we observe an
accelerated fertility rate below age 25 compared to the "normal" demographic trend. Another type of
manipulation e⁄ect pertains to living arrangements with partner/children for those who take up the RMI.
22For France, Laroque and SalaniØ (2004) consider the fertility e⁄ect of a replacement income for women with two or more
children (Allocation Parentale d￿ Education). There is an abundance of literature on the e⁄ects of the American welfare
system on fertility, cohabitation and single motherhood. Most studies￿estimates rely on variation in bene￿ts (in particular
the Aid to Families with Dependent Children, AFDC) over time and across US states to identify the welfare e⁄ect. Some
￿nd small signi￿cant e⁄ects (Schultz, 1994, Rosenzweig, 1999, Blau, 2004) while some ￿nd no e⁄ect at all (Mo¢ tt, 1994,
Hoynes, 1997).
20We argue that this potential bias concerns adults aged 25 and above only. Indeed, there is no incentive
for an inactive couple with a child, where both adults are under age 25, to declare di⁄erent addresses.23
However, if the man turns 25 before the woman (of if both are at least 25), this couple would receive
more if they declare that the man lives alone and the woman lives with the child (he would then receive
EUR 454 and she would get EUR 682, cf. table 1), rather than declaring that they live as a couple with a
child (they would only receive EUR 818 in this case). This type of manipulation implies that the change
in the proportion of men living with a partner and children should be discontinuous at age 25.
Unfortunately, it is di¢ cult to ￿nd a control group that would indicate what the "normal" fertility or
living arrangement patterns are. The best we could do with the available data was to perform a double
comparison using year 1982 (no RMI) and educated groups (less sensitive to the RMI), as reported in
￿gure 9 in the Appendix. We ￿rst observe that men tend to live with their partner and children earlier
and at a higher rate in 1982 than in 1999. This is possibly due to a combination of higher fertility and
lower probability of being single. Importantly, we observe that junior school dropouts under 25 have
higher fertility levels than the educated group but that this is the case for both years. Hence results do
not point to any speci￿c fertility acceleration before 25. Figure 9 also shows that the slope of the curve
for junior school dropouts 1999 does not change abruptly around the discontinuity point. This group
(black lines) shows a ￿ atter trend after age 24 compared to the educated group (grey lines), but this was
already the case in 1982; for both years, educated men tend to have less children in their early 20s but
catch up after age 27.
There is arguably a more direct and intuitive test of whether manipulation e⁄ects change the size of
the selected sample in a discontinuous way on both sides of the cuto⁄ point. It consists of examining the
density of the forcing variable itself at the discontinuity point. A jump in the density at the threshold
would suggest some degree of sorting around this point and would call into question the exchangeability of
observations on either side of it, as well as the validity of the RD approach.24 First of all, visual inspection
in ￿gure 10 does not suggest any such discontinuity in age. We also implement the test suggested by
McCrary (2008) to check the continuity of age at the threshold using only the closest observations. To
do so, we run local linear regressions of the fraction of men in each age group below and above the
discontinuity point, checking whether the fraction of men predicted to be at age 25 is the same for the
two regressions. We use a triangular kernel, i.e., weights on age groups in the local linear regressions
linearly decline from one at the discontinuity point to zero X years/quarters away from this point. We
obtain standard errors of the test by bootstrapping. We cannot reject the null that the density of age is
the same just below and just above the discontinuity point. For bandwidths X = 2, 3 and 5 years, the
p-values are 0:57, 0:35 and 0:31 respectively. For X = 8, 12 and 20 quarters, the p-values are 0:60, 0:42
and 0:35 respectively.
23A couple is eligible if at least one of the partners is aged 25 or over. The age of the other person holds no relevance for
the amount received, i.e, the couple still receives more than a single.
24Note that this test also accounts for direct manipulation of the forcing variable in the unlikely event that people can
cheat on their age when claiming the RMI.
215.9 Broader Demographic Groups
We ￿nally examine broader demographic groups, still focusing on junior school dropouts. In ￿gure
11 in the Appendix, we compare the trends in employment rates for single childless men, all childless
men (single and in couples) and all men. Estimates of the treatment e⁄ects for each group are reported
in table 6. Looking at broader groups partly solves the selection problem but, at the same time, the
employment e⁄ect is expected to be smaller.
Figure 11 con￿rms that men in couples are less sensitive to the treatment (for "all childless men",
the e⁄ect is signi￿cant only with age in quarters, cf. table 6). Several explanations may account for this.
In particular, men in couples may rely ￿nancially on their partner (or on their partner￿ s family). They
may be eligible for the RMI when their partner turns 25 so that we are no longer in the case of a sharp
discontinuity. More generally, the joint labor supply decision in couples is complex so that this broader
group does not lend itself to a clear-cut experiment as was the case for singles. In the broadest group
("all men"), around three-quarters of the men aged 25-35 are in couples and more than half have children
(and are thereby una⁄ected by the RMI age condition). Thus the strong e⁄ect for single males is diluted
in this larger group; unsurprisingly, in ￿gure 11, there is no longer a drop in the employment curve at 25
but simply a ￿ attening of the curve at that age.25
Interestingly, comparisons with other demographic groups help us to understand the pattern obtained
for the core group. Noteworthy was the fact that the employment rate for childless single men trends
upwards as a function of age but then ￿ attens out after the discontinuity. As revealed by ￿gure 11, this is
also the case for the broader group of men without children but in sharp contrast to the broadest group
("all men") including men with children. Therefore, this trend seems to be driven by the fact that men
without children are negatively selected in terms of their labor market prospects and that the magnitude
of the bias increases as a function of age (see Lemieux and Milligan, 2008, for similar ￿ndings). This result
was already present in 1982 for junior school dropouts (cf. ￿gure 7) and is not limited to this group: the
employment trend of childless men with a vocational degree, highschool diploma or a university degree
is also very ￿ at in this age range (graphs available upon request).
6 Conclusion
This study exploits a unique feature of the French guaranteed minimum income, namely that persons
aged under 25 are not eligible for it. We ￿nd strong evidence that the transfer program signi￿cantly
reduces the employment rate of single male junior school dropouts. The e⁄ect has been quanti￿ed:
around 7 ￿ 10% of the target group appears to withdraw from the labor market upon becoming eligible
25We have also run on micro data (using the broad sample of all men) a version of model (1) augmented with educational
and demographic dummies and their interaction with the treatment variable. These estimations con￿rm that the treatment
is signi￿cant for childless single men only. These additional results are available upon request.
22Table 6: Employment E⁄ect: Broadening the Demographic Groups
Statistics
Proportion of all men
Mean emp. rate
Regression discontinuity estimates
Linear -0.027 -0.028 ** -0.021 -0.022 0.035 0.034 ** 0.040 * 0.039 ***
(0.018) (0.014) (0.018) (0.013) (0.030) (0.016) (0.022) (0.012)
Quadratic -0.067 *** -0.069 *** -0.062 *** -0.064 *** -0.035 * -0.036 *** -0.019 -0.019 *
(0.013) (0.015) (0.013) (0.015) (0.018) (0.012) (0.013) (0.010)
Cubic -0.065 *** -0.067 *** -0.057 *** -0.060 *** -0.028 -0.029 ** -0.016 -0.016 *
(0.014) (0.016) (0.014) (0.015) (0.018) (0.013) (0.013) (0.010)
Linear spline -0.049 *** -0.058 *** -0.044 *** -0.053 *** -0.003 -0.018 * 0.010 -0.001
(0.010) (0.014) (0.009) (0.013) (0.011) (0.010) (0.012) (0.009)
Quadratic spline -0.067 *** -0.068 *** -0.059 *** -0.060 *** -0.024 -0.025 * -0.015 -0.015
(0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017) (0.023) (0.014) (0.015) (0.011)
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for the RMI.26 The treatment e⁄ect is insigni￿cant for those not a⁄ected by the 25 year-old threshold
(lone parents, uneducated men in 1982) and those less likely to be a⁄ected by small gains to work (higher
education groups). In a broader perspective, our results con￿rm that ￿nancial incentives do not only
concern married women and single mothers ￿as often reported in the empirical literature ￿but also
uneducated single men. This is all the more important as this group represents the core of welfare
dependents in France.
One would like to extrapolate these results to quantify the overall proportion of RMIsts a⁄ected
by supply-side e⁄ects. However, the treatment e⁄ect is identi￿ed only for single men aged around 25
and might not generalize to other age and demographic groups.27 Nonetheless, we note that the group
concerned by inactivity traps (junior school dropouts) is strongly over-represented in the population of
RMI recipients at all ages. For other demographic groups like single mothers, the e⁄ect may be even
stronger than for single males. This is demonstrated by the very low employment rates of single mothers
reported in this paper and by additional evidence in Piketty (1998, 2005).28
26Interestingly, both the magnitudes of the ￿nancial e⁄ect on disposable income and of the labor market response are
comparable to what is found for QuØbec in Lemieux and Milligan (2008).
27In addition, the e⁄ect measured at 25 is possibly underestimated. Indeed, as discussed in section 2, there is a potential
decrease in intrahousehold transfers to children when they reach 25, which may partly o⁄set the negative employment e⁄ect
of the RMI. Also, the supply-side e⁄ect may concern a larger group than those who stop work at 25 to take up the RMI,
and in particular those who did not work prior to the discontinuity, possibly relying on unemployment bene￿ts, family
solidarities or informal labor markets.
28For the group of single women, RD estimates are signi￿cant but smaller compared to what we found for males (results
23Because of these obstacles to extrapolation, we simply put some of our results in the perspective of a
more general policy context. It is interesting to notice that policy makers in France have focused their
attention on measures aimed at increasing ￿nancial incentives to work. Inspired by the example of family
tax credits in the US and the UK, they have adopted an earned income tax credit (Prime pour l￿ Emploi,
PPE) in 2001. This policy has been essentially designed as an individualized tax credit and hence covers
a large group of workers (around 8 million, i.e., 30% of the labor force); as a result, redistributed amounts
are small and incentive e⁄ects are suspected to be weak .29 Yet, our results suggest that inactivity traps
exist but are probably con￿ned to those with low education levels (or facing high costs of work, like single
mothers). This calls for a better targeting of ￿ make work pay￿policies.30 Also, we show that single men
with apprenticeships do not seem to be a⁄ected by the RMI. Interestingly, this group has only marginally
higher expected wages than junior school dropouts. Thus the question remains about whether stronger
attachment to the labor market for this group is provided by the degree itself or re￿ ects self-selection and
unobserved characteristics. In the former case, targeted policies aimed at helping uneducated workers
to build up their human capital, increase their potential market wage and reduce job search costs might
prove e⁄ective.
A clear limitation of the present study is that we have left aside all redistributive aspects. Youth
poverty is a particularly acute problem in France. As explained in the text, young workers are excluded
from the labor market and, at the same time, are not covered by either UB or the RMI. This explains
the high poverty rate among 18-24 year olds: around 10% are under the 50% median poverty line (o¢ cial
de￿nition in France) compared to 5:5% for the 25-30 year olds and 6:3% for the overall population.
Further research should evaluate the implication of limited access to social assistance for young workers
and the relationship between labor market achievement and poverty among the young. A recent report
to the Prime Minister advocates the extension of the RMI/RSA to 18-24 year olds (Cahuc et al., 2008).
Commentary made in this report nonetheless points out the risk of a negative impact on employment in
this age group.
Several aspects are not discussed in the paper but are worth investigating and relevant for the poverty
issue. The ￿rst is the possibility of receiving income from informal sector activities. This may further
decrease the di⁄erential between ￿nancial returns to "o¢ cial" work and welfare payments, and hence
exacerbate the disincentive e⁄ect due to the RMI. In this case, it would be interesting to verify if the
target group characterized in the present study does indeed increase its participation in the shadow labor
market at age 25. Fortin et al. (1994) actually show that high implicit marginal tax rates associated with
social programmes have an important e⁄ect on the decision to work in the shadow economy. Another
point relates to dynamic aspects. We have simply considered the static participation e⁄ect of the RMI.
available upon request). As argued previously, however, selection problems are more likely to arise for this population.
29Nonetheless, Stancanelli (2008) ￿nds signi￿cant employment e⁄ects using a di⁄erence-in-di⁄erent approach.
30Note that in 2009, a new system known as Revenue de SolidaritØ Active (RSA) will replace the RMI by introducing
the possibility of permanently cumulating earnings and transfers. Means-tested on household income, this scheme should
be better targeted at low-income families.
24The program may also a⁄ect the intertemporal allocation of labor supply.31 Yet it seems unlikely that
those who anticipate leaving the labor market at age 25 work more in the years before. On the contrary,
it is possible that the RMI encourages younger workers to linger in precarious activities while "waiting"
for the RMI, as suggested by the signi￿cant decrease in the proportion of temporary contracts at age 25.
If the underground economy is an option, labor supply is not zero after 24 in any case. Finally, margins
other than labor supply may be a⁄ected by the RMI and, in particular, training decisions.32
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Figure 11: Employment Rate for All Male JS Dropouts













in Euro 6.6 7.0 7.5 9.0 12.0 7.6
in prop. of the minimum wage 1.06 1.13 1.21 1.46 1.94 1.22
Average working time (hours/week)
for participants 37.9 39.0 39.0 38.9 39.3 39.0
incl. zeros 26.3 29.3 23.7 27.5 26.9 27.7
Relative financial gain to work*
full time 0.63 0.70 0.74 0.99 1.58 0.75
part time 0.04 0.08 0.13 0.27 0.55 0.13
Distribution (%) - all 0.22 0.37 0.13 0.11 0.10
Distribution (%) - RMI recipients 0.52 0.22 0.08 0.05 0.07
Unemployment rate (seniority <5 years) 41.8 17.6 12.6 15.6
Unemployment rate (seniority btw 5 and 10 years) 25.9 11.7 5.8 9.3
Sources : Labor Force Survey, own calculation by microsimulation, and INSEE.




Table 8: Sample Composition, All Men
Age Cell size % JS dropouts Cell size % w/children Cell size % w/children % w/parents
20 75,788 0.107 8,106 0.033 7,421 0.001 0.903
21 75,835 0.096 7,278 0.065 6,157 0.001 0.870
22 74,636 0.094 7,038 0.097 5,432 0.003 0.826
23 74,550 0.100 7,462 0.153 5,059 0.005 0.786
24 83,162 0.104 8,657 0.204 5,110 0.007 0.734
25 88,047 0.111 9,774 0.260 5,138 0.010 0.689
26 96,615 0.119 11,538 0.307 5,410 0.013 0.627
27 98,602 0.127 12,515 0.363 5,314 0.013 0.579
28 99,451 0.138 13,710 0.428 5,246 0.018 0.540
29 97,550 0.141 13,733 0.475 4,767 0.021 0.506
30 97,539 0.146 14,244 0.525 4,641 0.024 0.478
31 98,037 0.147 14,381 0.565 4,414 0.029 0.449
32 100,316 0.152 15,222 0.597 4,329 0.033 0.413
33 102,512 0.157 16,103 0.618 4,497 0.039 0.395
34 104,110 0.159 16,583 0.639 4,453 0.042 0.365
35 105,396 0.160 16,899 0.655 4,366 0.047 0.347
Note: These descriptive statistics are based on the French Census data covering 1/4 of the population.
JS dropout 1999 All men 1999
All men 1999 Single men 1999
31